On November 12, the Government of Republika Srpska presented its 10th report to the United Nations Security Council. The executive summary is below.
Introduction and Executive Summary
Republika Srpska (RS), a party to all of the annexes that comprise the Dayton Accords, respectfully submits this 10th Report to the UN Security Council. The report examines developments since the 9th Report and outlines the RS Government’s views on some key issues
facing Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The RS’s central goal is improving the economic condition of its citizens. To this end, the RS is pursuing the end of the High Representative’s counterproductive role in BiH, the enactment of economic and judicial reforms, the advancement of EU integration, and the protection of BiH’s decentralized constitutional structure.
I. The OHR’s unlawful and counterproductive role must end.
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), the most important barrier to BiH’s political development and its progress toward the EU, must close at last. The so-called “Bonn Powers” claimed by the High Representative are plainly contrary to the Dayton Accords and the civil and political rights of BiH citizens. Moreover, it is becoming widely recognized that the presence of a High Representative claiming such dictatorial authorities undermines the consensus-building and compromise that are essential for democratic states to function. Despite the growing recognition of the OHR’s corrosive effects on BiH’s political development, the current High Representative, Amb. Valentin Inzko, has continued to interfere frequently with BiH’s constitutional institutions. Although many in the international community are concluding that the OHR’s role in BiH should end, some continue to assert that BiH should first fulfill the so-called “5+2” objectives and conditions identified by the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in 2008. But the 5+2 formula is inherently counterproductive and unworkable because it ensures that political parties that consider the OHR an ally will block the fulfillment of the last remaining conditions for its closure.
II. The RS is pressing ahead with economic and EU-integration reforms.
In order to improve the economic situation of its citizens, the RS is continuing to implement a wide range of reforms, deepening the reform process that has dramatically improved its business environment. In July, for example, the RS enacted a sweeping set of 13 laws to remove barriers to business. The RS has also fulfilled all IMF requirements to continue receiving loans. As part of the RS’s consistent commitment to the process of European integration for BiH, it is continuing the practice started in 2007, harmonizing intensely its legislation with acquis communautaire. The RS’s efforts to improve its business environment and attract investment are
paying off with major new projects that will create jobs and economic growth.
III. BiH must retain the decentralized structure of the Dayton Constitution.
Decentralized governmental structures have had great success in improving administrative efficiency, particularly in countries that, like BiH, have deep regional differences. It is BiH’s decentralized structure that has enabled the RS to have, unlike the FBiH, a fully functional government and to enact far-reaching economic reforms to encourage job creation and economic growth. Another reason BiH must keep its decentralized structure is the inefficiency, dysfunction, non-transparency, irrationality, and unaccountability of BiH-level institutions. Moreover, as the EU has made clear, BiH’s decentralized constitutional structure is not a barrier
to EU integration.
IV. FBiH conflicts are holding back BiH’s progress.
Conflicts among the parties in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), BiH’s other entity, as well as obstructions by Bosniak parties, continue to block most political progress at the BiH level. A crisis that began with the May 2012 breakdown in the FBiH’s governing coalition continues to largely paralyze the FBiH government and hamper BiH-level reforms. In an important milestone for EU integration, BiH began its first census since 1991 on 1 October. But other important measures remain blocked by the failure of FBiH parties to agree or by obstruction by Bosniak parties. There has been significant progress in talks on the establishment of a coordination mechanism for EU integration and on the implementation of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Sejdić-Finci v. BiH. The only remaining issues preventing establishment of the coordination mechanism and implementation of Sejdić-Finci are matters that require agreement between the FBiH’s Bosniak and Croat parties. Although both houses of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly voted to approve constitutionally required changes to BiH’s personal identification number law in July, the law’s implementation was blocked by a parliamentary maneuver by the Bosniak caucus of the House of Peoples.
V. BiH justice system institutions are resisting the adoption of European standards.
As the RS pursues judicial reform through the EU’s Structured Dialogue on Justice, BiH’s judicial institutions are resisting the changes necessary to meet European standards. The Court of BiH is fighting to thwart reforms to its enabling law, including necessary amendments to a jurisdictional provision that experts have said violates European standards. Recently, the Court of BiH has even reacted with defiance to a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. Though BiH’s system for appointing judges and prosecutors violates European standards, BiH’s High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council is resisting all reforms that would curtail its sweeping power. In addition, the BiH Prosecutor’s Office violates European standards with its abuses of power and its failure to prosecute many of the worst war crimes against Serbs. In addition, there is a troubling lack of transparency throughout the BiH judicial system. BiH’s judicial institutions should cooperate with the reforms required to meet European standards.
VI. The Security Council should end the application of Chapter VII, which has no factual or legal basis.
There is a strong international consensus that BiH does not constitute a threat to peace. The situation in BiH in no way warrants the determination required for the UN Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: that there exists a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” After nearly 18 years of peace and progress in BiH, there is simply no justification for the UN Security Council to continue acting under Chapter VII.
