In a recent interview with Al Jazeera, President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik admitted that he does not “love BiH,” though he respects the legitimacy of the state as constituted under the Dayton Agreements. When issued from the mouth of Mr. Dodik, statements like this elicit criticism from all directions, as representatives of the international community and political rivals within BiH rush to accuse him of seeking to destroy the state and the constitution.
Love, of course, cannot be legislated. And it seems reasonable enough that Mr. Dodik would harbor mixed emotions for BiH, to which Republika Srpska is bound but was not allowed to participate in creating. But whatever he may feel (or not feel) about BiH, what must be admitted by observers is that Mr. Dodik upholds its constitution.
Dodik and the RS have drawn scorn from local foes and the international community for discussing the idea of a popular referendum on the powers of the High Representative, for questioning BiH’s need for a military it can’t afford, and for criticizing a bloated and only partly constitutionally-valid judiciary. None of these activities is either illegal or harmful to BiH.
Meanwhile, Mr. Dodik’s self-appointed nemesis, High Representative Valentin Inzko, goes un-remonstrated for bragging about–and worse yet, using–his infamous “Bonn Powers,” which are both unconstitutional and a clear violation of the sovereignty of BiH, which was guaranteed by the Dayton Agreements. Political leaders in BiH’s other entity, the Federation, have spent the better part of two years dragging their parties and constituents through an endless saga of governmental dysfunction without ever having been accused of “threatening Dayton” or “bringing Bosnia closer to war,” charges which are recklessly tossed around when critics speak of Mr. Dodik.
Despite this, President Dodik seems to spend less time responding to critics and more time doing the hard work of governance than many on the political scene. In recent months he has crafted a broad political agreement with one of his most powerful rivals (a move that was welcomed by nearly all other parties in BiH, save the SDA, but was immediately attacked by foreign diplomats), and put forward a realistic proposal for resolving the Sejdic-Finci controversy, all the while heading up a government that has passed laws, produced budgets, and fostered positive relations with neighboring states; tasks which both the Federation and BiH governments have been almost completely unable to perform.
When judged by his actions rather than by the rhetoric of his opponents, Mr. Dodik’s commitment–grudging or not–to BiH and the Dayton Agreements is obvious. One might even be forgiven, at least in the case of the Dayton Agreements, for mistaking it for love.
